by Jeannine McGrane
“Antitrust suits were brought against six pharmaceutical firms by four foreign governments under Section 4 of the Clayton Act. The foreign states sought to recover treble damages for injuries resulting from an alleged conspiracy among the drug companies to fix prices and to exclude competition in the sale of tetracyclin, a broad spectrum antibiotic, in contravention of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.[…]”
Texto completo: viewcontent.cgi (application/pdf Objeto).
Jeannine McGrane, U.S. Antitrust Law- Clayton Act – Private Trebel Damage Suits – Standing of Foreign Governments to Sue: Pfizer, Inc v. Government of India, 2 Md. J. Int’l L. 177 (1977).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol2/iss2/6
La Oficina de Comercio de EE UU no aprecia que el buscador abuse de su posición dominante.
Google pacta cambiar de forma voluntaria algunas prácticas que también le reprocha la Comisión.
Bruselas mantiene la investigación sobre Google, tras el carpetazo dado por EE UU | Economía | EL PAÍS.
Fuente: Diario El País
WASHINGTON — The Federal Trade Commission on Thursday handed Google a major victory by declaring, after an investigation of nearly two years, that the company had not violated antitrust or anticompetition statutes in the way it arranges its Web search results.
A Victory for Google as F.T.C. Takes No Formal Steps – NYTimes.com.
Google Inc. está cerca de salir sin rasguños de una investigación federal de dos años sobre sus operaciones de búsquedas en Internet, dijeron fuentes familiarizadas con el asunto, un resultado que posiblemente decepcione a sus rivales que esperaban que el gigante de Internet tuviera que enfrentar un litigio antimonopolio.
Fuente: The Wall Street Journal
by THOMAS L. GREANEY
Chester A. Myers Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Health Law Studies,
Saint Louis University School of Law.
This article grew out of the American Antitrust Institute’s 11th Annual Conference, are the boundaries between public and private in transition? Many thanks to the AAI and Bert Foer for focusing national attention on antitrust policy.
by Robert T. Joseph
Forum on Franchising’s Franchise Law Journal, Volume 31, Number 1, Summer 2011. American Bar Association.
by Jesse W. Markham, Jr.
Marshall P. Madison Professor of Law
University of San Francisco School of Law
Competitive restraints challenged under Section 1 of the Sherman Act are evaluated under either the rule of reason or, for a small and diminishing group of restraints, under per se rules. The role for per se rules has diminished in recent years as courts have retreated from them out of concern that their rigid application can condemn desirable competitive conduct. Now, the rule of reason is the default mode of analysis applicable to nearly all categories of alleged competitive restraints. During the same period in which the Supreme Court expanded the reach of the rule of reason, it also rendered it devoid of the little guiding content that it previously had. Thus, one hundred years after the rule of reason was first announced in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911), the rule has been rendered essentially devoid of any meaningful content.
This article traces the disintegration of the rule of reason and argues for a restoration of categorical modes of analysis for claims brought under Section 1. From its inception, the rule of reason has called for a dangerously open-ended inquiry. However, in an earlier era, certain specific and familiar categories of conduct were condemned per se, which gave Section 1 a region of clarity. In California Dental Ass’n v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999), the Supreme Court obliterated the line between per se and rule of reason analysis, and abandoned categorical antitrust analysis almost entirely. The overall result is that the rule of reason now governs nearly all Section 1 claims, but its meaning is substantially less clear now than it was 100 years ago. A set of presumptions about the lawfulness of restraints is needed to guide courts and businesses in the evaluation of restraints under Section 1.
Long-term natural gas contracts and antitrust law in the European Union and the United States.
Lecturer in International Energy and Resources Law at the UCL School of Energy and Resources, Australia. Member of the CoE Foundations of European Law and Polity. Editor-in-Chief for Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence (www.ogel.org).
Long-term natural gas contracts and their specific features are at the forefront of legal and policy discussions around the world. Issues like oil price indexation and price reviews, flexibility and take-or-pay clauses or a move to shorter term trading are being debated. This is particularly true for Europe where major changes are taking place, but also in places like Australia and Asia.
This study will focus on the antitrust treatment of long-term take-or-pay natural gas contracts and their specific provisions in the European Union and the United States. It will also examine the regulatory treatment of these contracts and the regulatory environment in which these contracts operate. Issues that are covered include questions on duration and volumes, take-or-pay provisions and oil indexation, destination or use restrictions, vertical integration and monopolization.