What companies don’t know can hurt them: antitrust law developments in vertical restraints

By William R. Vigdor & Dennis S. Schmelzer

“Antitrust compliance properly focuses on agreements and communications between competitors because of the heightened risk associated with such conduct. Yet overreaching restrictions on distributors or customers can pose antitrust risk as well. This article provides a brief update on developments in the antitrust law of vertical restraints and highlights areas that continue to be complex, or areas where the law appears to be evolving. In-house counsel may wish to consider reviewing corporate compliance policies and distribution agreements to account for these changes.”

Texto completo: VigdorSchmelzer-CorpCounselNewsletter-Spring2013.pdf application/pdf Objeto.

Fuente: The Law Firm of Vinson & Elkins, A Global Law Firm Serving Business Clients

U.S. Antitrust Law- Clayton Act – Private Trebel Damage Suits – Standing of Foreign Governments to Sue: Pfizer, Inc v. Government of India

by Jeannine McGrane

“Antitrust suits were brought against six pharmaceutical firms by four foreign governments under Section 4 of the Clayton Act. The foreign states sought to recover treble damages for injuries resulting from an alleged conspiracy among the drug companies to fix prices and to exclude competition in the sale of tetracyclin, a broad spectrum antibiotic, in contravention of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.[…]”

Texto completo: viewcontent.cgi (application/pdf Objeto).

Jeannine McGrane, U.S. Antitrust Law- Clayton Act – Private Trebel Damage Suits – Standing of Foreign Governments to Sue: Pfizer, Inc v. Government of India, 2 Md. J. Int’l L. 177 (1977).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol2/iss2/6

NOTE: Identifying a Maverick: When Antitrust Law Should Protect a Low-Cost Competitor

by Taylor M. Owings

Vanderbilt Law Review.

January, 2013
66 Vand. L. Rev. 323

 
“Shortly after taking office, President Barack Obama announced that his Administration would pursue a policy of vigorous antitrust enforcement in order to ensure healthy competition in the economy. 1 In two of the highest-profile antitrust cases that have followed, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) sought to block two proposed mergers in which the target companies were low-cost competitors in their industries. The DOJ won a judgment in November 2011 that blocked retail-tax giant H&R Block from acquiring 2nd Story Software, maker of the low-cost digital tax-preparation program TaxACT. 2 A month later, the DOJ scored another “victory” when AT&T dropped its bid to acquire the low-cost telecommunications provider T-Mobile USA…”

Ver más:

NOTE: Identifying a Maverick: When Antitrust Law Should Protect a Low-Cost Competitor.

Sailing a Sea of Doubt: A Critique of the Rule of Reason in U.S. Antitrust Law

by Jesse W. Markham, Jr.

Marshall P. Madison Professor of Law

University of San Francisco School of Law

Abstract:

Competitive restraints challenged under Section 1 of the Sherman Act are evaluated under either the rule of reason or, for a small and diminishing group of restraints, under per se rules.  The role for per se rules has diminished in recent years as courts have retreated from them out of concern that their rigid application can condemn desirable competitive conduct.  Now, the rule of reason is the default mode of analysis applicable to nearly all categories of alleged competitive restraints.  During the same period in which the Supreme Court expanded the reach of the rule of reason, it also rendered it devoid of the little guiding content that it previously had.  Thus, one hundred years after the rule of reason was first announced in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911), the rule has been rendered essentially devoid of any meaningful content.

This article traces the disintegration of the rule of reason and argues for a restoration of categorical modes of analysis for claims brought under Section 1.  From its inception, the rule of reason has called for a dangerously open-ended inquiry.  However, in an earlier era, certain specific and familiar categories of conduct were condemned per se, which gave Section 1 a region of clarity.  In California Dental Ass’n v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999), the Supreme Court obliterated the line between per se and rule of reason analysis, and abandoned categorical antitrust analysis almost entirely.  The overall result is that the rule of reason now governs nearly all Section 1 claims, but its meaning is substantially less clear now than it was 100 years ago.  A set of presumptions about the lawfulness of restraints is needed to guide courts and businesses in the evaluation of restraints under Section 1.

Long-term natural gas contracts and antitrust law in the European Union and the United States

Long-term natural gas contracts and antitrust law in the European Union and the United States.

Kim Talus

Lecturer in International Energy and Resources Law at the UCL School of Energy and Resources, Australia. Member of the CoE Foundations of European Law and Polity. Editor-in-Chief for Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence (www.ogel.org).

Abstract

Long-term natural gas contracts and their specific features are at the forefront of legal and policy discussions around the world. Issues like oil price indexation and price reviews, flexibility and take-or-pay clauses or a move to shorter term trading are being debated. This is particularly true for Europe where major changes are taking place, but also in places like Australia and Asia.

This study will focus on the antitrust treatment of long-term take-or-pay natural gas contracts and their specific provisions in the European Union and the United States. It will also examine the regulatory treatment of these contracts and the regulatory environment in which these contracts operate. Issues that are covered include questions on duration and volumes, take-or-pay provisions and oil indexation, destination or use restrictions, vertical integration and monopolization.

Harmonizing Antitrust and Patent Law

Harmonizing Antitrust and Patent Law by Elizabeth Winston :: SSRN.

Abstract:
Antitrust and intellectual property laws promote innovation and competition. As long as the costs of promotion do not exceed the benefit to society, then the laws act in harmony. Discord arises when patent holders use public and private ordering to restrain competition, restrict downstream trade, prevent the development of competing products and limit output by competitors. Using the Patent Act and the misperception of antitrust immunity to create a parallel and under-regulated legal system allows a small number of patent holders to coordinate their behavior to maximize profits and minimize competition. The Patent Act provides no shield to prosecution for antitrust violations – such is a patent misperception only. Harmony comes from balancing the costs of protection with the benefit to society. Innovation is best protected through the protection of intellectual property rights and the protection of competition.

Antitrust Law in the wake of the recente financial crises.

 

 

A critical analysis of the status quo and a roadmap for reinforcing enforceability.

Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal Dr. / Prof., University of London (SOAS)
Ioannis Kokkoris Dr. / Prof., University of Reading

 

Abstract

During the financial crisis companies and markets found themselves in distressed situations. Competition authorities across the globe had to deal with controversial issues such as the application of the failing firm defence in merger transactions as well as assessment of crisis cartels. This chapter considers antitrust policy in periods of crisis, and in particular the ‘failing firm’ defence in merger control and the treatment of crisis cartels. Antitrust policy played a useful role in a period of crisis but might be a secondary concern during such times. This approach is the key to the long-term benefits of competition for consumers and for the economy as a whole in terms of growth and increased productivity.

http://works.bepress.com/rodrigo_olivares-caminal/1

Conductas anticompetitivas

La CNDC multó a las empresas de TV por cable Multicanal y Cablevisión por reparto de mercado en la provincia de Santa Fe.

Resolución N° 219/10 – Dictamen N° 678/10

Política de los programas de clemencia en el ámbito del derecho antitrust

por María Paula Molina y Diego Pablo Povolo

Resumen

Según un estudio de la OCDE los perjuicios causados por el accionar de cárteles ascienden a miles de millones de dólares de daños para los consumidores. En consecuencia combatirlos es uno de los principales objetivos de las agencias de competencia mundiales.

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